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Corruption and economic growth (with Vietnam case-study) 
 
Nguyen Ngoc Anh l Nguyen Ngoc Minh l Binh Tran-Nam 
 
Abstract Despite the Government’s recognition of the serious threat of uncontrolled 
corruption to the legitimacy and long-term survival of the current political system, 
Vietnam is still struggling to translate its policies and comparatively strong legislative 
framework into practice. There exists little reliable, quantitative evidence of the 
harmful impact of corruption on economic growth in Vietnam. Using the most 
updated and available data and a model incorporating transmission channels, this 
article attempts to estimate the direct and indirect effects of corruption on GDP 
growth rate.  In general, the findings confirm the negative association between 
corruption and economic growth.  Investment appears to be the most important 
transmission channel and the effect of corruption on investment is non-linear so that 
indirect effects of corruption on growth (via investments) depends on the value of 
each country’s corruption level.  In case of Vietnam, a one unit increase in the 
corruption perception index (CPI)1 leads to a 2.15% increase in the proportion of 
gross domestic investment over GDP, which in turns increases growth rate by 
0.372%.  Counting both direct and indirect effects, a one-unit increase in the 
corruption perception index (CPI) will increase the growth rate by 0.509%, indicating 
that the investment channel accounts for 62.92% of total effects. 
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1. Introduction and Context 
 
Corruption is a costly phenomenon for individuals, businesses, orgnizations, the 
public sector and the economy in general.  The harmful effects of corruption on 
national economic development are widely acknowledged in the economics literature.  
Using empirical approaches, several authors have shown that corruption detracts 
investors, reduces the productivity of public expenditures, distorts the allocation of 
resources and thus lowers economic growth ([1], [2], [3], [4]).  The magnitude of the 
costs of corruption has also been the focus of various international studies.  According 
to the World Bank’s estimate, the cost of corruption at the global level is about 1 
trillion US dollars per year in a world economy of 30 trillion US dollars [5] 
(Kaufmann, 2005). According to the African Development Bank, the cost of 
corruption for Africa may reach 25% of the continent’s GDP [6].  
There is consensus that corruption is a serious threat to the national development 
of Vietnam.  In particular, the government recognizes the threat that corruption poses 
to the legitimacy and long-term survival of the political system and, as a result, has 
taken some steps to address the problem. Although some progress has been made (i.e., 
passage of the Anti-corruption Law, the Anti-corruption strategy 2020, etc), Vietnam 
is still struggling to translate its policies and comparatively strong legislative 
framework into practice on the ground.   
Despite its important policy implications, there appears to be little research into the 
costs of corruption in Vietnam.  Previous studies on corruption have mostly focused 
on measuring the prevalence of corruption, and identifying its forms and causes ([7], 
[8]).  More recently, there have been a number of attempts to measure the costs of 
corruption.  For example, in the annual Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 
survey, there is a questionnaire that does try to capture the amounts of bribes firms 
have to pay as a percentage of their sales [9].  Similarly, the recent survey in 2012 by 
DEPOCEN also attempted to capture the actual financial magnitude of bribery at the 
firm level [10].  Although interesting, the magnitude of these estimates only capture a 
small part of the true total costs of corruption, as they ignore the effects of corruption 
on system efficiency and performance, as well as the particularly adverse effects of 
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corruption on the poorest populations.  This is somewhat surprising given that 
Vietnam needs to sustain high growth rates for decades in order to avoid the middle 
income trap.  There is thus an urgent need for concrete, overall estimates of the 
harmful effects of corruption on economic development in Vietnam. 
The main purpose of this artcile is to estimate the costs of and impact of 
corruption. It asks whether corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, or 
said differently, whether lower corruption levels in a country is associated with higher 
GDP growth. Using international, macro-level data sets of over seventy countries, the 
article begins by specifying and estimating the multiple operationalisations of the 
costs of corruption . The results of this estimation is then used to quantify the impact 
of corruption on economic growth in Vietnam..  
It is expected that the findings of this article will provide interested stakeholders 
(e.g anti-corruption agencies, officials, business and donors) with much needed 
evidence to show that corruption hampers economic development. It is also 
anticipated that this kind of research will encourage further studies on the impact of 
corruption on Vietnam’s economic growth. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth.  The estimation methodology 
and data employed in this article are described in the next two sections respectively.  
Estimation results and implications are then discussed and analyzed.  The final section 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the impact of corruption on economic growth remains inconclusive 
despite the growing number of studies over a long time period.  Some authors argue 
that corruption could facilitate economic growth, while others consider corruption as 
a barrier to economic growth.  In this section, the theoretical background governing 
the effect of corruption on economic growth is first presented.  The empirical results 
are then critically reviewed.  In addition, the contribution of transmission channels 
between corruption and economic growth are discussed.  
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Theoretical framework 
There is an important strand of literature that considers that corruption is the essential 
‘grease’ to run the bureaucratic wheels.  In a pioneering contribution, Leff (1964) [11] 
claimed that in a second best world characterized with the distortions caused by ill-
functioning institutions, bribery is necessary to reduce the rigidities which constraint 
economic growth and reduce investment, especially in underdeveloped countries. For 
example, the difficulties of an investment decision of an enterprise may arise from 
economic and political environments such as the unknown and irrational behavior of 
the government. In this case, corruption could reduce uncertainty and increase 
investment because bribes are expected to enable the enterprise to control and affect 
the decision of government employees.   
In the same vein, Lui (1985) [12] suggested a bribing model in which the decision 
of paying bribes by the customers could achieve social optimal equilibrium. If the 
customers take into account their time value and some other characteristics, their 
decisions could lead to the social optimal point due to waiting cost minimization.  In 
addition, given the customers’ decision, the governmental officials could improve 
their efficiency and make decisions faster.  Similarly, with a less extreme view on the 
positive effect of corruption, Beck & Maher (1986) [13] found that there is an 
indifference between bribery and the competitive bidding model because  the most 
competitive firm, i.e. the firm producing the same product with the lowest cost, would 
be able pay the highest “bidding” bribery price.  Hence, corruption can improve 
efficiency by providing the projects for the most efficient firms.  A more recent study 
by Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) proposed that property rights enforcement, which is 
decided by the government officials, is the key condition for wealth creation.  
Consequently, it is necessary to prevent all forms of corruption.  However, the costs 
associated with doing so are prohibitively high, making the socially optimal resource 
allocation obtained with less than full enforcement of property rights and some 
corruption.  
Opponents of the ‘efficiency enhancing’ school of thought (which together 
contribute to the ‘sand in the wheel’ hypothesis) argue that the positive impact of 
corruption is based on weak and problematic assumptions. For instance, they argue 
the efficiency enhancing approach assumes that the bureaucrats will work to promote 
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economic growth. Tanzi (1998) [14] claimed that the rigidities are not the nature of 
the society, but created by the governmental officials, especially in case where such 
obstacles can attract more bribes.  Consequently, it is unreasonable to claim that 
corruption can enhance the efficiency by removing rigidities.  Myrdal (1968) [15] also 
state that, in case of corruption, rather than accelerating administrative procedures, 
officials would maintain the rigidities in order to receive more payments.  Kaufmann 
and Wei (1999) [16] support this view, arguing that, bureaucrats can endogenously 
choose regulatory burdens and delays. Consequently, firms are likely to spend more 
time in negotiating with the officials, leading to higher cost of capital.  In contrast to 
Beck and Maher (1986) [13], firms which pay the highest bribes may not be the most 
economically efficient ones because they would consider bribe as a high rate of return 
on investment (Tanzi, 1998 [14]). 
It should be noted that corruption does not impact the efficiency only through the 
price mechanism alone. For example, Murphy et al. (1991) [17] found that, due to 
corruption, people are likely to move from productive to unproductive rent-seeking 
activities.  In other words, it is corruption that causes the employment reallocation to 
the lower-than-optimal point, which would harm the human capital and consequently 
economic growth.  Moreover, corruption also impacts on domestic and foreign 
investment, trade openness and political stability, as has been studied in the literature.  
Review of empirical studies 
Empirical results largely confirm the inefficiency view.  Mauro (1995) [18] employed 
cross-section data including 58 countries during the 1960−85 period and found that 
the negative relationship between corruption and economic growth is statistically and 
economically significant.  The negative relationship between corruption and growth 
was later confirmed by many empirical studies [Mauro (1997) [18], Tanzi (1998) 
[14], Mo (2001) [19], Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2004) [20], Pierre-Guillaume & Khalid 
(2005) [21], [22 & Herzfeld (2005) [22], Hodge et al. (2009) [23], and Dridi (2013) 
[24]]. Besides data issues, these empirical studies question the causality and the 
robustness of the relationship between economic growth and corruption, as we now 
explain.  
The causal relationship between corruption and economic growth has encountered 
three major issues.  First, although the interpretation that corruption leads to lower 
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economic growth has dominated the literature, the reverse relationship (lower 
economic growth leads to corruption) seems to be equally reasonable.  In fact, some 
people argue that economic growth is the determinant of a country’s corruption level 
because preventing corruption is known to be a costly process, which low income 
countries cannot afford.  In other words, questions remain over whether corruption 
negatively determines growth or vice versa.  Moreover, estimation bias may arise 
from corruption indices which are mostly based on the perception of people in very 
different countries.  Finally, many factors, which determine economic growth and are 
included in the growth model, are influenced by corruption. 
The robustness of the relationship between economic growth and corruption may 
also be questioned because of the significant effect of corruption on economic growth 
disappears when other variables, such as investment, human capital, political 
instability, etc, are included in the model.  Further, the impacts of these factors are not 
consistent among different countries.  Regarding the country context, Svensson 
(2005) [25] argued that a puzzle remains in the relationship between corruption in a 
cross-country setting.  More recent studies have confirmed this view and introduced 
non-linear relationships between economic growth and corruption.  These studies 
suggest that the association between corruption and economic growth depends on the 
institutional quality.  For example, Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) [26] studied the 
impact of corruption on long-run growth and found that the type of political regime is 
an important determinant of that relationship. 
Additionally, they also found a non-monotonic relationship after a number of 
economic variables had been controlled for and the sample was restricted to ‘free’ 
countries that have achieved a high level of political freedom. The result indicates the 
growth-maximizing level of corruption actually exists and is significantly greater than 
0, which is later interpreted as saying that corruption facilitates economic growth at 
low levels of incidence while it is harmful at high levels.  A study conducted by Aidt 
et al. (2008) [27] drew similar findings.  Specifically, in the regime with high quality 
of political institutions, corruption is found to have a significantly negative impact on 
economic growth.  However, the corruption appears to have no impact on growth in 
low quality political regimes.  The strong point of this study is that, instead of 
splitting the sample of countries according to some predetermined rule like Méndez 
and Sepúlveda (2006) [26] did, the data is allowed to determine to which of two 
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potential growth regimes a country belongs.  More recent studies also support this 
result.  For example, Pierre-Guillaume & Khalid (2005) [21] employed a panel data of 
54 developed and developing countries and found that corruption is positively 
associated with efficiency in countries with ineffective institutions and vice versa.  
Most recently, Assiotis and Sylwester (2013) [28] investigated the impact of 
corruption on economic growth given democratic and non-democratic regimes.  They 
demonstrated that the association between corruption and economic growth is less 
positive, and could even be negative in democratic regimes.  In summary, all authors 
in this strand of empirical studies provide evidence that countries with high 
institutional quality tend to suffer more from corruption, while those with less 
effective institutional frameworks could even benefit from corruption. 
Another problem found in empirical studies is that the significant relationship 
between corruption and economic growth tends to disappear when other controlling 
variables are included in the regression model. When Mauro (1995) [18] included 
investment in the list of independent variables in his OLS regressions, the coefficient 
on the corruption index becomes statistically insignificant.  Similarly, when adding 
the structural reform index to the growth regression which includes a corruption 
index, initial real per capita GDP, initial life expectancy, inflation rate and the ratio of 
fiscal balance to GDP, the coefficient on corruption index also became insignificant 
(Abed & Davoodi, 2000 [29]). Other authors such as Mo (2001) [30], and Pellegrini 
and Gerlagh (2004) [20] also confirmed this finding.  This trend could be interpreted 
that the effect of corruption on economic growth is transmitted through other 
determinants of growth (Dridi, 2013) [24]. 
Transmission channel between corruption and economic growth 
To address the above issue, particularly addressing the robustness and causality of the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth, some authors have suggested 
that besides its direct impact on growth, the impact of corruption may also be 
transmitted indirectly through some transmission channels, for example by affecting 
key determinants of growth such asdomestic private investment, human capital, 
investments, etc.  
Mauro (1995) [18] appeared to be the first author who raised the idea about the 
transmission channels between corruption and economic growth.  However, it is not 
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until Mo (2001) [30] that empirical proof was provided concerning the exact 
channels.  This study used data for 45 countries during the 1970−85 period and 
estimated the impact of corruption on economic growth through different types of 
channels by OLS regression using corruption as a determinant of economic growth.  
The significantly negative association between corruption and economic growth is 
observed when the model includes the initial per capita income, political right index, 
and rate of population growth.  Accordingly, a one percent increase in corruption 
level leads to a 0.72% reduction of economic growth.  However, the coefficient of 
corruption index becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for human 
capital, political instability and investment.  Moreover, the value of the coefficient 
also witnesses a sharp decrease from 0.545 to 0.064.  This leads to the conclusion that 
apart from the direct impact of corruption on economic growth, the indirect effects of 
corruption on economic growth through some channels such as investment, human 
capital, and political stability are observed.  Among those, the impact of corruption on 
political stability proved to be the most important channel, accounting for 53% of 
total effect.  The indirect effects of the other two channels, investment and human 
capital, account for 21.4% and 14.8% respectively.  The drawback of this research is 
the validity of instrumental variables (regional dummies and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index) is not tested properly. 
A later study conducted by Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2004) [20] utilized the same 
method as Mo (2001) [30] with a dataset that covers a slightly longer period of time 
(1980−2004 versus 1975−1996) and a different set of instrument variables for 
corruption.  They examined both direct and indirect effects of corruption on economic 
growth and confirmed a negative impact of corruption on economic growth.  The role 
of the transmission channel is significant, accounting for 81% of the overall impact.  
The indirect effects of the four channels (investment, trade openness, political 
instability and human capital) are 32%, 28%, 16% and 5% respectively. 
In terms of methodology, decomposition and channel methodology dominate the 
literature, but the former seems to be more popular (Dridi, 2013) [24].  However, the 
decomposition method is problematic since “it explicitly includes independent 
variables that are theoretically and empirically consequences of corruption” (Akai et. 
al, 2005) [31].  In order to tackle this problem, the channel methodology involving a 
set of equations can be employed. The major difference between two methods is that 
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the channel methodology excludes corruption in the growth regression and covers a 
set of equations, which is jointly estimated by the three-stage least squares (3SLS). 
Dreher & Herzfeld (2005) [22] employed 3SLS to estimate seven equations, one of 
which captures the direct impact of corruption on economic growth and the remaining 
six equations estimated the effect of the contribution channels.  Regarding data, 71 
countries from 1975 to 2001 were examined in this study.  One point increase in the 
corruption index is associated with 0.451%, 0.225%, 0.129% increases in economic 
growth.  On the other hand, foreign aid proves to reduce economic growth.  Other 
channels such as life expectancy, school enrolment, and initial GDP do not provide a 
significant relationship between them and economic growth. It was confirmed that if 
the corruption index increases by one point, GDP growth will reduce by 0.13%. 
Likewise, Hodge et al. (2009) [32] used a cross-section data of 81 countries over 
the period from 1984 to 2005, which is a significantly larger coverage in comparison 
to previous studies.  Moreover, they divided the time period into different five-year 
and six-year periods to capture the business cycle effect.  Better still, this study 
collected data on corruption from two sources to check the consistency of result, 
namely Political Risk Services (ICRG), and Control of Corruption (WB).  Compared 
to the study of Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) [20], this research is better in terms of 
control variables. The control variables in the study of Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) 
[20] are similar among different channels.  Moreover, the cross dependence between 
those channel variables is not examined.  This issue is solved in this study since each 
channel has a set of control variables.  The estimation results suggest that corruption 
has a negative effect on growth through the investment, human capital and political 
instability channels, while corruption facilitates economic growth via the trade and 
government consumption channels.  They argue that effort to lower corruption could 
reduce trade volumes. A country that prohibits its firms to engage in corruption 
practices would limit its own firms’ ability to compete against firms from other 
countries who were able to engage in corruption. Again, Hodge et al. (2009) [32] 
found a negative and statistically significant effect of corruption on economic growth. 
Similarly, Dridi (2013) [24] followed the channel methodology to estimate the 
contribution of five transmission variables, which includes investment, human capital, 
government expenditure, political instability and inflation, and draws consistent 
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results with previous studies.  This study covers 82 countries from 1980 to 2002 and 
uses a variety of corruption index.  The major transmission channels are human 
capital and political instability and investment is not proven to be a significant 
transmission channel.  The overall negative effect of corruption on economic growth 
is confirmed. 
In summary, the relationship between corruption and economic growth remains 
inconclusive both theoretically and empirically.  Many studies reveal the significant 
negative effect, while others find an insignificant relationship. In addition, a number 
of papers revealed  that the negative association would change when taking into 
account other variables or the institutional quality of a country.  This could be 
explained by the fact that the effect of corruption on economic growth is transmitted 
through particular channels, such as investment, human capital, political instability 
etc.  In this paper, we rely on more recently available data to revisit the growth – 
corruption relationship and at the same time disentangle the channels through which 
corruption may have effects on growth. We also analyse this with a special focus on 
Vietnam.    
3. Estimating	Methodology	
 
To address our key research question (is lower corruption levels in a country 
associated with higher GDP growth?) and test our hypothesis that there is a negative 
impact of corruption on growth, we follow the approach set out by Mo (2001) [30]. 
This consists in estimating this impact by drawing on the transmission channel 
method. First, GDP growth rate is regressed on initial GDP per capita (Y0) and 
corruption and later on a number of other common independent variables which are 
believed to operate as transmission channels for corruption on growth. We focus on 
key transmission channels, including human capital (HC), investment (INV), and 
institution as measured by “voice and accountability” (V&A).  
In this baseline model, the direct effect of corruption on growth	is	captured	by	β
5
.	
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛽0
	
+ 	𝛽1
	
𝑙𝑛𝑌0	 + 	𝛽2
	
𝐻𝐶 + 	𝛽3
	
𝐼𝑁𝑉	 + 	𝛽4
	
𝑉&𝐴	 + 𝛽5
	
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 	𝜀		(a)	
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Besides the direct effect, corruption can have indirect effects on growth through 
transmission channels of a number of intervening variables. In our paper, we focus on 
the following channels: i) investments, ii) human capital, and iii) institution as 
measured by voice and accountability. Following the literature, each of these 
intervening variables is specified as a function, among other variables, of corruption. 
In particular, the following channels are specified and estimated:   
𝐻𝐶 = 𝛼0
	
+ 	𝛼1
	
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐	 + 𝛼2
	
𝑃𝑆𝐸 + 	𝛼3
	
𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛	 + 	𝛼4
	
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀		(𝑏)			𝐼𝑁𝑉 = 𝛿0
	
+ 	𝛿1
	
𝑆𝑆𝐸 + 𝛿2
	
𝑙𝑛𝑌0 + 	𝛿3
	
𝑃𝑂𝑃15 + 	𝛿4
	
𝑃𝑂𝑃65 + 	𝛿5
	
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 +	𝛿6
	
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀	(c)	𝑉&𝐴 = £0
	
+ 	£1
	
𝑙𝑛𝑌0 + 	£2
	
𝐿𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 	£3
	
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀			 𝑑 						
To estimate the total impact of corruption on growth, these equations will be 
estimated separately and the relevant coefficients of corruption will be combined to 
derive to total impact of corruption on economic growth, with the following formula   𝑑𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑑𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 = 𝜕𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝜕𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝜕𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝜕𝑇𝐶 𝜕𝑇𝐶𝜕𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁VW 	
To estimate the direct and indirect effects, we substitute equations (b), (c), and (d) 
in (a). As a result, β
5	
captures the direct effect of corruption on growth and	 (α
4
β
2
	 +	
δ
6
β
3
	+	£
3
β
4
) is the	indirect of corruption on growth. 	
As discussed above, the relationship between corruption and economic growth is 
potentially endogenous. The standard practice in the literature to deal with this 
problem is to use instrumental variable approach. The most popular instrument is 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (see Mauro 1995, Mo 2001, Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
2004). However, Easterly and Levine (1997) suggested that ethnic diversity has direct 
effects on growth, and may therefore not be an appropriate instrument for measuring 
corruption. Other instrumental variables used in the literature include regional dummy 
variables (Barro–Lee 1991, Mo, 2001), legal origins (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004). In 
our paper, we employ legal origins dummy variables as an instrument for corruption. 
The results of endogeneity and over-identification tests confirm the validity of legal 
origins as a relatively strong instrumental variable in our study. 
4. Data 
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In order to estimate the impact of corruption on economic growth, we need to use 
national level data.  The data, which includes economic indicators, governance and 
corruption indices and fixed factors such as legal origin, regional factors, and level of 
development, is constructed from three major sources.  The economic indicators 
including GDP growth rate, gross domestic investment, and population, are obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) [33].  Meanwhile, corruption 
indices are collected from two main data sources, the World Governance Indicators 
(World Bank) [34]  and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency 
International [35]). 
Economic data goes as part back at 1960 for some countries, but in the case of 
Vietnam, it is only available from the 1990s.  Similarly, despite the fact that the 
Transparency International CPI has been collected from 1980, Vietnam has only been 
included in the Index since 1995.  Even then, we are unable to choose the period 
starting from 1995 because the country coverage of the CPI was small and varied 
between years.  For example, 1995, 1996 and 1997 only cover 41, 54 and 52 countries 
respectively.  Another problem is that although the country coverage increased to 
around 90 countries from 1998 to 2001, the CPI of some countries has not been 
continuously collected. The availability of the CPI was recorded consistently for 81 
countries from 2000 to 2012, so this thirteen-year period is chosen for this study.  
Among those 81 countries, Argentina did not report GDP indicators in 2012, and 
Zimbabwe had a negative growth rate. Thus, there are 79 countries included in our 
sample, generating 1,040 observations in total. To obtain the cross country dataset, we 
calculate the average of each variable over the period under study. 
The dependent variable2 -- GDP growth rate -- is a compound of annual growth 
rate in the period from 2000 to 2012.3 As mentioned above, the measure of corruption 
is drawn from two sources: World Governance Indicators (WB) and CPI (TI).  The 
data obtained from these two different sources appears to be highly correlated4 so the 
CPI is chosen.  This index varies from 0 to 10, where a higher index indicates a less 
corrupt country. The population growth rate is the proxy for that of human capital 
because the data on population is more reliable (Mo, 2001) [30].  The physical capital 																																																								
2 A variable is said to be dependent when it changes in response to iterations to the value(s) of the independent 
variable(s).  3	r	denotes	annual	GDP	growth	rate.	It	is	defined	as	follow:	rGDP2000*(1+r)13=GDP2012	where	GDP2000	and	GDP2012	are	real	GDP	in	2000	and	2012	respectively.	4	The	CPI	and	WGI	(Control	of	corruption)	have	a	correlation	of	99%. 
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is measured by gross domestic investment (public and private) as a percentage of 
GDP.    
Our baseline model of corruption and economic growth without transmission 
channels incorporates 79 countries. However, due to missing value for gross domestic 
investment as percentage of GDP, and secondary education gross enrolment for a few 
countries, we are left with less than 79 observations depending on the specification to 
be estimated. There are a few countries where the data on legal origin is missing for 
the Instrumental variable (IV) equation. 71 countries are used when running 
regression in order to capture all variables in the models. The descriptive statistics of 
variables used in our studies is introduced in Table 1.. Usually, the impact of 
corruption on growth is estimated within the framework of growth regression. In our 
empirical work, the initial income is measured by log of GDP per capital in 2000 and 
included in the model as the initial income level would influence the growth rate. 
Population is also included as a measure of labour in the growth model. We include 
government spending on education as an independent variable for the human capital 
regression and . 
Table 1. Summary of Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Trade (% of GDP) 71 88.0 54.6 25.5 369.3 
Gross Domestic Investment (%GDP) 71 22.6 4.6 10.1 42.9 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 71 25.2 9.8 13.8 49.1 
Population ages 65 and above (% of total) 71 10.1 5.6 2.5 20.6 
Urban population (% of Total) 71 64.7 20.0 13.8 100.0 
Public spending on education 71 4.9 1.4 2.7 8.4 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 71 87.0 25.2 21.1 140.4 
Voice and accountability 71 0.4 0.9 -2.0 1.6 
Log of GDP per capital in 2000 71 8.6 1.6 5.4 11.2 
Growth 71 3.6 2.2 0.1 12.1 
Log of GDP per capita (mean) 71 8.9 1.5 5.5 11.3 
Corrupion (CPI - rescaled) 71 5.9 2.4 1.5 8.9 
Corrupion (Control of corrruption - rescaled) 71 2.1 1.1 0.0 3.6 
Landlock 71 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Because the correlation between the CPI and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption 
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(CoC) is very high, we estimate the impact of corruption on growth using these two 
indices and obtain very similar results. In this paper, however, we report only the 
estimation results using the CPI, and will make the estimation results available upon 
request. 
Initial estimation results 
We first estimate our cost of corruption on growth using simple regression model and 
the results are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2: Corruption and growth – OLS regression 
VARIABLES 
Growth  
(without 
transmission 
channel) 
Growth  
(without  
corruption) 
Growth (with 
corruption and 
transmission 
channels) 
School enrollment, secondary (% 
gross)  0.022** 0.023*** 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
Gross domestic investment (%GDP)  0.175*** 0.173*** 
   (0.031) (0.029) 
Voice and Accountability  -0.599** -0.890*** 
   (0.257) (0.273) 
Log of GDP per capita in 2000 -1.214*** -0.890*** -1.149*** 
  (0.214) (0.188) (0.208) 
Corruption (CPI - rescaled)5 -0.180   -0.303** 
  (0.144)   (0.121) 
Constant 15.140*** 5.558*** 9.708*** 
  (2.621) (1.475) (2.184) 
Observations 79  75  75  
R-squared 0.536  0.732  0.754  
 
The specification in column 1 includes only the initial GDP and the corruption index. 
Like previous studies, the initial capital is statistically significant. However, contrary 
to what Mo (2001), and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) reported, the corruption 
variable is not significant statistically. This is also the finding that motivates Mauro 
(1995) to suggest the transmission channel. The specification in column 2 includes 
our transmission channel variables but not corruption index. The specification in 
column 3 includes both corruption and transmission channel variables. The overall 																																																								
5 The corruption index is rescaled as an inverse of the original scale to facilitate 
interpretation. The higher the corruption score, the higher the level of corruption 
prevalence. 
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diagnostic statistics suggest that the model fits with the data relatively well. We find 
that corruption is negatively correlated with growth.  
Our finding is different from the results of Mo (2001), and Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004) for another reason. In previous studies using transmission channels, authors 
often stated that the role of corruption decreases when transmission channels are 
included into the growth model. For other variables, the coefficient on the share of 
domestic investment has the expected sign and indicates that a 10% increase in the 
share of domestic investment in GDP will lead to a 1.73% increase in GDP 
growth rate (Column 3). Secondly, similar to investment, human capital (school 
enrollment in secondary) has a significant and positive impact on growth, since a 
10% increase in school enrollment increases GDP growth rate by 0.23% (Column 
3). In contrast, higher levels of voice and accountability are associated with lower 
levels of growth (Column 3). This could be because countries that experience high 
levels of voice and accountability are often more-developed countries and vice versa, 
although this would need to be further researched. In general, the GDP growth rate of 
these countries is often lower than the GDP growth rate of developing countries. 
Instrumental variable approach 
Previous studies point out that the relationship between corruption and growth may be 
subject to endogeneity. Following the standard approach to control for potential 
endogeneity of corruption and growth, we rely on the instrumental variable method. 
In our analysis, we use the legal origins as instrument, as is often carried out in 
previous studies (e.g. Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004).  
The results of the first-stage estimation are summarized in the Appendix. The results 
of instrumental variable regression together with endogeneity and over-identification 
tests are presented in Table 3. Overall, the test statistics indicate that the legal origin 
passes all the tests for a good instrument. Qualitatively, the results from the 
instrumental variable regression are similar to what we obtained from the OLS 
regression. The estimated coefficient of corruption index is statistically significant 
and has a negative sign which suggests that corruption is bad for growth.  
Table 3: Corruption and growth – Instrumental variable  
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VARIABLES  Growth 
Corrupion (CPI - rescaled)  -0.504** 
   (0.221) 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.023*** 
   (0.008) 
Gross domestic investment (%GDP)  0.171*** 
   (0.030) 
Voice and Accountability  -1.108*** 
   (0.329) 
Log of GDP per capital in 2000  -1.313*** 
   (0.263) 
Constant  12.407*** 
   (3.408) 
Observations  71  
R-squared  0.754  
Test of endogeneity  No 
Durbin Chi2 (p-value)  0.254 
Wu Hausman F (p-value)  0.278 
Test of overidentification  No 
Sargan Chi2 (p-value)  0.328 
Basmann Chi2 (p-value)  0.367 
 
Transmission channels 
As discussed in the literature, the coefficient of the corruption index only reveals the 
direct effect of corruption. In order to capture the indirect impact of corruption on 
growth through investments, human capital, and institutions, we estimate and report 
results of three regression models of the transmission variables on corruption in Table 
4. As can be seen, corruption is found to be related to these variables in both positive 
and negative ways, and this relationship is statistically significant.   
There are a few interesting things to note, however. First, corruption is positively 
correlated with human capital (Column 1). The fact that human capital is positively 
correlated with growth suggests that corruption hence has some growth-enhancing 
effect.6 Second, corruption is negatively correlated with institutions/political regime 
as measured by voice and accountability. This has a negative impact on growth. 
																																																								
6 Hodge et al (2009) find that corruption does not have impact on human capital. 
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Hence through this channel, corruption “greases” the wheels of growth., although 
corruption is negatively associated with growth through the investment channel.   
Table 4:  Transmission channels 
VARIABLES Human capital Investment Voice and  accountability 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)   -0.041   
    (0.036)   
Log of GDP per capital in 2000   -2.328*** 0.278*** 
    (0.747) (0.074) 
Corruption (CPI - rescaled) 2.740* -0.803* -0.150*** 
  (1.408) (0.420) (0.049) 
Log of GDP per capita (mean) 15.184***     
  (2.584)     
Public spending on education 2.879**     
  (1.336)     
Urban population (% of Total) 0.248*     
  (0.129)     
Population ages 0-14 (& of total)   -0.690***   
    (0.143)   
Population ages 65 and above (& of total)   -0.686***   
    (0.215)   
Trade (% of GDP)   -0.007   
    (0.010)   
Landlock     0.036  
      (0.149) 
Constant -95.154*** 76.088*** -1.154 
  (30.003) (12.127) (0.939) 
Observations 72  75  79  
R-squared 0.750  0.339  0.704  	
Corruption and growth: Direct impact and Transmission channels 	
In Table 5, we calculate the impact of corruption on growth under a number of 
scenarios drawing on some statistical estimates from Table 4 and following the 
transmission method. We first calculate the total impact of corruption on growth using 
all three channels and then simulate the impacts assuming each of the transmission 
variables alternatively. As discussed above, the impact of corruption on growth is 
more complicated than we originally thought. There is evidence that corruption 
greases the wheels of growth through improvement in human capital and voice and 
accountability. At the same time, corruption sands the wheels though the investment 
channel and the impact though this channel is relatively high. However, despite its 
“greasing the wheel” effect, the net impact of corruption on growth is negative.  
Table 5: The indirect and indirect effects of corruption on growth 
a) With transmission channel 
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 All channels (1) 
Human capital 
(2) 
Investment 
(3) 
Voice & 
accountability 
(4) 
Direct impact -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 
Indirect impact     
Human capital 0.023*2.740=0.063 
0.023*2.740=0.06
3   
Investments 
0.171*-
(0.803)=0.137  
0.171*-(0.803)=-
0.137  
Voice & 
accountability 
(-1.313)*(-0.150) 
=0.196   
(-1.313)*(-0.150) 
=0.196 
Total Impact -0.381 -0.441 -0.641 -0.307 
b) without transmission channel 
Total Impact -0.191 -0.191 -0.191 -0.191 	
6. Case-study analysis for Vietnam 
The Government of Vietnam recognizes the threat that corruption poses to the 
legitimacy and long-term survival of the political system, and as a result has taken 
some steps to address the problem. This includes passing the 2005 Anti-corruption 
Law and other relevant legislation (e.g. on asset disclosure and money laundering), as 
well as drafting a National Strategy for the fight against Corruption towards 2020. 
There have been efforts to reform and modernize Public Administration Systems as 
well. However, Vietnam is still struggling to leverage on these efforts and translate 
policies into practice, and  corruption perception levels remain high.   
Meanwhile, whilst there is literature on corruption in Vietnam, there is a relatively 
little research that has gone into understand the costs of corruption. Previous studies 
mostly focused on measuring the prevalence forms and causes of corruption. 
Recently, however, there have been a number of attempts to address this gap. For 
example, the annual Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) survey questionnaires 
try to capture the amount of bribes firms have to pay as a percentage of their sales. 
Similarly, the recent survey conducted by DEPOCEN in 2012 also attempts to capture 
the actual financial magnitude of bribery at the firm level. Although interesting, the 
magnitude of these final estimates only captures a fraction of the true total costs of 
corruption, as they ignore the effects of corruption on system efficiency and 
performance, as well as the adverse effect of corruption on the poorest populations.  
Empirical results 
20		
Based on the panel data and analysis presented earlier in the paper, we estimate the 
impact of corruption on growth for Vietnam from 2000 to 2012. On average, the 
country’s GDP growth in this period is 6.732%. 
If the corruption level fell one unit of the ‘CPI rescaled’ (meaning that the CPI of 
Vietnam increases from 2.639 to 3.639), the economy would growfrom 6.732% to 
6.941%. Moreover, since the standard deviation of the ‘CPI rescaled’ is 2.369, this 
suggests that if corruption levels in Vietnam fell one standard deviation (CPI 
increases from 2.639 to 5.008), then Vietnam could achieve a growth rate of 7.227% 
on average during the 2000-2012 period (i.e. an increase of 0.495 percentage points 
from the actual average of 6.732%). The more detailed calculation on the effect of 
corruption on growth in Vietnamese context is described in Table 6 below.  
Table 6: Simulation results for Vietnam 
  
Effect of 
corruption 
(CPI) 
GDP growth 
(Average GDP 
growth = 
6.732%) 
Effect of 
corruption 
(CoC) 
GDP growth 
(Average GDP 
growth = 
6.732%) 
  -0.209 
 
-0.307 
 Corrruption reduce 1 unit 0.209 6.941 0.307 7.039 
Corrruption reduce 1 Sd 0.495 7.227 0.338 7.070 
Corrruption reduce 2 Sd 0.990 7.722 0.675 7.407 
Corrruption reduce 3 Sd 1.485 8.217 1.013 7.745 	
7. Conclusions  
 
This article set out to investigate the relationship between growth and corruption. 
Specifically, it asked whether lower corruption levels in a country are associated with 
higher GDP growth. Our key hypothesis is that there is a negative correlation 
between the two (corruption hampers growth). To address this, we used recent panel 
data from 2000 to 2012 to both evaluate the direct and indirect effects. Drawing on 
analyses conducted by Mo (2001) [30], we disaggregate the indirect effects of 
corruption on economic growth through three transmission channels: i) investment in 
physical capital; ii) human capital (Education); and iii) institutions.(measured through 
Voice & Accountability)  
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Our hypothesis is confirmed. Using both a simple regression model and instrumental 
variable approach, we find there is a negative correlation between corruption and 
growth. Specifically, we show that:  
- A 10% increase in the share of domestic investment in GDP will lead to a 
1.73% increase in GDP growth rate.  
- A 10% increase in school enrolment increases GDP growth rate by 0.23% 
(school enrolment therefore has a significant and positive impact on growth) 
- In contrast, however, higher levels of voice and accountability are associated 
with lower levels of growth. 
In order to capture the indirect impact of corruption on growth through three 
transmission channels (investments in physical capital, investments in human capital, 
and institutions, we estimate and report results of three regression models of 
transmission variables on corruption. We show that: 
- Corruption is positively correlated with human capital  
- Corruption is negatively correlated with institutions 
This article complements our understanding of how corruption affects growth. This is 
particularly true for our understanding of the costs of corruption to the Vietnamese 
economy, provided in the case-study analysis. We find that: 
- If the corruption level fell one unit of the ‘CPI rescaled’ (meaning that the CPI 
of Vietnam increases from 2.639 to 3.639), the economy would growfrom 
6.732% to 6.941%. Moreover, since the standard deviation of the ‘CPI 
rescaled’ is 2.369, this suggests that if corruption levels in Vietnam fell one 
standard deviation (CPI increases from 2.639 to 5.008), then Vietnam could 
achieve a growth rate of 7.227% on average during the 2000-2012 period.  
These findings not only show that corruption undermines growth, but also how this 
can happen. This analysis – particularly on Vietnam -- is timely. The global economy 
is slowly recovering from the downturn than began in 2008. In Vietnam, the recovery 
is still fragile. The country is transitioning from a low to middle-income economy. 
And whilst levels of Foreign Direct Investments in the country are healthy, there is 
increasing competition with direct neighbours, and a growing unease with high 
corruption levels in Vietnam, and how this undermines competitiveness. This paper is 
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particularly useful in demonstrating to policy-makers, business leaders and other 
stakeholders, the real impact corruption has, and the potential loss of earnings it 
generates. Moreover, the findings do not only show that investment matters, but also  
that investments in social development and human factors such as education can 
eventually lead to positive dividends.  
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Appendix	1:	Instrumental	variable	regression	–	First	stage	model		
VARIABLES	 First	stage	of	growth	model	
School	enrollment,	secondary	(%	gross)	 -0.009	
		 (0.008)	
Gross	domestic	investment	(%GDP)	 -0.025	
		 (0.026)	
Voice	and	Accountability	 -0.687***	
		 (0.212)	
Log	of	GDP	per	capital	in	2000	 -0.745***	
		 (0.163)	
leg_british	 0.868*	
		 (0.490)	
leg_french	 1.893***	
		 (0.472)	
leg_socialist	 2.261***	
		 (0.553)	
leg_german	 1.182**	
		 (0.580)	
Constant	 12.420***	
		 (1.324)	
Observations	 71	
R-squared	 0.875	
 
